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Abstract
The growing use of Internet service in the past few years have facilitated an increase in the denial of service (DoS) attacks. Despite the best
preventative measures, DoS attacks have been successfully carried out
against high-profile organizations and enterprises, including those that
took down Chase, BOA, PNC and other major US banks in September
2009, which reveal the vulnerability of even well equipped networks. These
widespread attacks have resulted in significant loss of service, money, and
reputation for organizations, calling for a practical and efficient solution
to DoS attack detection and mitigation.
DoS attack detection and mitigation strengthens the robustness and
security of network or computer system, by monitoring system activities
for suspicious behaviors or policy violations, providing forensic information about the attack, and taking defensive measures to reduce the impact
on the system. In general, attacks can be detected by (1) matching observed network traffic with patterns of known attacks; (2) looking for
deviation of traffic behavior from the established profile; and (3) training a classifier from labeled dataset of attacks to classify incoming traffic.
Once an attack is identified, the suspicious traffic can be blocked or rate
limited.
In this presentation, we present a taxonomy of DoS attack detection
and mitigation techniques, followed by a description of four representative
systems (Snort, PHAD, MADAM, and MULTOPS). We conclude with a
discussion of their pros/cons as well as challenges for future work.
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1

Introduction

The growing use of Internet service in the past few years have facilitated an
increase in the denial of service (DoS) attacks [20]. Despite the best preventative
measures, DoS attacks have been successfully carried out against high-profile
organizations and enterprises [1], including those that took down Chase, BOA,
PNC and other major US banks in September 2009, which reveal the vulnerability of even well equipped networks. These widespread attacks have resulted
in significant loss of service, money, and reputation for organizations, calling for
a practical and efficient solution to DoS attack detection and mitigation.
Network intrusion detection system (NIDS) provides avenues to detect DoS
attacks and other types of intrusions, and produces reports to help system administrator perform further analysis on the attacks. Some NIDSs aim to detect
attacks in real-time and stop an attack in progress, whereas others focus primarily on providing after-the-fact forensic information about attacks to help
repair damage, understand the attack mechanism, and reduce future attacks of
the same type. It is well recognized that NIDS has become an essential part for
developing robust and secure network systems against DoS attack. While its
importance is recognized, designing and implementing effective NIDS remains
challenging, due to the ever increasing scale and complexity of network traffic
and unpredictability of unforeseen attacks.
Over the past few years, there have been extensive research activities developing effective DoS detection techniques. Various techniques have been proposed for detecting DoS and are evaluated systematically on network traffic
trace collected from testbed or production networks [17, 18, 4]. In general, attacks can be detected by (1) matching network traffic against a set of rules that
encodes patterns of known attacks [22, 24, 30]; (2) looking for deviation of traffic
behavior from established profile [19, 4, 32, 7, 5]; and (3) training a classifier
from labeled dataset of attacks to classify incoming network traffic [16, 21]. Depending on the choice of detection paradigms, these techniques differ in their
detection rate, false alarm rate, adaptability to attack variations, among other
performance metrics.
Once an attack is detected, attack mitigation mechanism uses the characterization of suspicious traffic to take defensive measures, e.g. packet filtering and
rate limiting. To further reduce the impact on the target network, suspicious
traffic can be blocked remotely at upstream router via pushback [10], or redirected to and from a cleaning center that has sufficient network and computation
resource to filter out malicious traffic [2].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide an overview
of denial-of-service attacks in Section 2. Section 3 provides a taxonomy of the
techniques and systems proposed for denial-of-service attack detection. We then
present four representative systems to explain different detection techniques:
we discuss Snort in Section 4, PHAD in Section 5, MADAM in Section 6, and
MULTOPS in Section 7. Section 8 discusses two techniques for mitigating
distributed denial-of-service attacks. Finally, Section 9 provides a comparison
of surveyed systems and discusses challenges.
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2

Overview

In this section, we first provide a taxonomy of intrusions against computer
systems, followed by a detailed description of denial-of-service attacks that discusses their method, impact, detection, and recent incidence.

2.1

Intrusion against Computer Systems

Denial-of-service attack belongs to a broader class of intrusion against computer systems. Its detection techniques, in general, are also applicable to other
types of intrusions. In practice, DoS attack is usually detected together with
other types of intrusions in a single system, namely, network intrusion detection
system. Here we provide a taxonomy of intrusions against computer systems.
• Probe: Probe describes activities that can systematically scan a network
of machines to gather information or to find known vulnerabilities. Its use
is typically followed by other more dangerous attacks because it provides
a map of machines or service that have known vulnerability in a network.
• Remote-to-local (R2L): In R2L attack, an attacker who doesn’t have
user account on the target machine gains unauthorized access to that machine via remote connection. The specific examples include buffer overflow
attack, network worm, and trojan program.
• User-to-root (U2R): U2R describes attacks where local users of the system obtain unauthorized access to confidential information or root privilege. These attacks typically exploit the weakness in the operating system
or system programs running with root privilege, including those programs
which are susceptible to buffer overflow attack.
• Denial-of-service (DoS): DoS attack is generally characterized by an
explicit attempt to make a system or network resource unavailable to its legitimate user. This is typically achieved by (1) exploiting the software bug
in the target system to crash it completely, or (2) sending large amounts
of useless traffic towards target system to simply exhaust its computer or
network resource.

2.2

Denial-of-service Attack

DoS Classification: Denial-of-service attack, as its name suggests, attempts
to deny the service of target system from its legitimate users. Depending on
exploits it uses, DoS can be further classified into vulnerability DoS and flood
DoS.
• Vulnerability DoS exploits the weakness in system design, implementation or configuration to reduce system performance or crash it completely.
As a typical example, a teardrop attack attempts to crash the target
system by sending intentionally malformed packets which are incorrectly
handled by the target machine.
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• Flood DoS exploits the resource asymmetry between the attacker and
victim, and attempts to exhaust the computation or network resource of
the victim by sending huge amounts of malicious traffic at the same time.
– Distributed-denial-of-service attack (DDoS) is a primary example of flood DoS, in which attackers or compromised hosts form
a coordinated attack against a common target. Attacks can be
launched from millions of compromised hosts around world in such a
way that easily overload the target network and system.
Although DDoS attack is easy to detect by measuring the traffic
load on the target network, it is extremely hard to mitigate, for two
reason: (1) it does not rely on any particular system weakness except
for resource asymmetry. (2) it would be prohibitively expensive or
even impossible to deploy enough computation and network resources
at each enterprise network to combat large scale DDoS attack.
DoS Examples: DoS attack can be carried out in a variety of ways, each
exploiting different vulnerability of target system. Here we present several representative DoS attacks to explain their method, impact, and detection.
• Teardrop attack: Teardrop attack is a vulnerability DoS attack. It
involves sending mangled IP fragments with overlapping, over-sized payloads that can crash various operating systems which have a bug in their
TCP/IP fragmentation reassembly code. Therefore, teardrop attack can
be detected by looking at the fragmentation flag in the IP packet header;
it can also be prevented by simply upgrading operating system.
• Ping of death (PoD): PoD is another vulnerability DoS attack, which
involves sending an oversized ping packet to crash the target operating system. Specifically, PoD exploits the bug in operating systems that can not
handle a ping packet larger than the maximum IPv4 packet size (65,535
bytes). It can therefore be detected by looking for oversized ICMP packet.
Nowadays this attack is mostly historical because this bug is fixed in most
systems.
• ICMP flood: ICMP flood is a typical example of reflector-based DoS
flood attack. Instead of flooding the victim directly, the attacker sends
ICMP echo requests to broadcast addresses of mis-configured networks,
where each host on the network responses with an ICMP packet to the
victim. As a result, the mis-configured network amplifies the flood on the
victim. This attack can be prevented by filtering out ICMP packets with
broadcast address.
• SYN flood: SYN flood is another form of DoS flood attack that attempts
to exhaust connection state tables in the target system. Specifically, it
exploits the TCP three-way handshake process by initiating many TCP
connections but not completing them, until no new connections can be
made by legitimate traffic. Nowadays even high capacity devices capable
of maintaining states on millions of connections can be taken down by
such attacks.
5

• Bandwidth attack: Bandwidth attack is a primary form of DDoS attack
that simply overloads the target network by generating huge amounts
of normal-looking network traffic, such as HTTP request, DNS request,
etc. Nowadays bandwidth attacks routinely exceed 100Gbps. As a well
known example, in Feb 2000, a number of high-profile websites were taken
down for several hours, including Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, CNN, and many
others.
DoS Detection: DoS attacks can be detected in a variety of ways. Here we
briefly discuss it in the context of vulnerability DoS and flood DoS separately.
• Vulnerability DoS: In general, vulnerability DoS can be detected on
per-packet basis by examining the packet header values, and comparing
the observed values with either patterns of known attacks or those of
legitimate packets. For instance, teardrop attack can be detected by examining the fragmentation flag in the packet header, as we will show later
in Figure 4.
• Flood DoS: Flood DoS is much straightforward to detect, since it typically involves abnormally large amounts of packets or connections that
can be easily observed using simple statistical measures, e.g. number of
connections made in a given time window. However, it can be extremely
difficult to tell flood DoS traffic from legitimate traffic, because it can be
composed of entirely normal-looking traffic that simply overloads victim’s
system capacity.
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Taxonomy of Denial-of-service Detection

Here we present an overview of existing systems that performance DoS detection, and classify them according the taxonomy in Figure 1.

Audit!Source
Usage!Frequency
!!!!!!!!DoS!Detec(on!
Model!Genera(on

Detec(on!Paradigm

Network>based
Host>based
Real>(me
Delayed
Programmed
Learned
Signature>based
Anomaly>based
Classiﬁca(on>based

Figure 1: Classification of DoS Detection Systems
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3.1

Network-based vs. Host-based Detection

Based on the source of audit data, we categorize DoS detection systems into
network-based detection and host-based detection. Host-based detection employs
the host operating system’s audit trails as the main source of input to detect
malicious activity [26, 14], whereas network-based detection builds its detection
mechanism on monitored network traffic [22, 31].
Network-based and host-based detection usually differ in their deployment
location and the impact on the target system. Network-based detection can be
deployed at enterprise network gateway or ISP core routers. A single networkbased detection system, when properly placed, can monitor a large network of
heterogeneous systems with little or no impact on their performance, whereas
host-based system usually has the potential to degrade host’s operating system
performance due to the processor time needed to perform monitoring functions.
With ever-increasing scale of distributed systems and rapid development of
Internet, there has been growing interest and trend towards developing networkbased detection system, largely due to its advantage in 1) monitoring a large
network of heterogeneous systems simultaneously with single deployment and
central management; 2) causing little or no impact on the performance of existing systems; 3) capability to effectively detect and mitigate DoS attacks. For
this reason, we will focus on the network-based detection system in this survey.

3.2

Real-time vs. Delayed Detection

Based on the time of detection, we categorize detection systems into realtime detection and delayed detection. Real-time detection processes data continuously and performs DoS detection in real-time [22, 4], whereas delayed detection processes data at regular interval, which in turn delays the time of
detection [9, 27].
Real-time detection has the advantage of detecting attacks and enabling
mitigation response as soon as possible before further damage are inflicted.
However, this may not be possible when (1) the audit data is collected from
multiple source and aggregated at regular interval; and when (2) the system
processing capacity can not keep up with the network throughput.

3.3

Programmed vs. Learned Detection

In programmed DoS detection system, the model or rules used for DoS attack detection are manually written by security experts. For instance Snort [24]
performs real-time analysis on collected traffic data using rules that characterize the patterns of known attacks. However, this approach requires significant
amount of manual effort to analyze and extract patterns from malicious traffic.
In addition, the resulting rules may not extend well to other environment.
In recognition of this deficiency of programmed approach, there are increasing interest in developing learned DoS detection system where the rule-set or behavior model is learned from the traffic data using data mining or machine learning techniques in an automated way. Example systems include Honeycomb [13],
which creates attack detection signatures using longest common string matching algorithm on malicious traffic captured by honeypot, and PAYL [31], which
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profiles byte frequency distribution of packet payload from the attack-free traffic
observed in the past.

3.4

Detection vs. False Alarm rate

The key performance metric in DoS detection systems is of course the extend
to which they can correctly detect attacks and avoid false alarms. The detection
rate is defined as the percentage of actual attacks that are detected, whereas
false alarm rate is calculated as the percentage of legitimate traffic that are
classified as attacks. High false alarm rate essentially renders system impractical
to deploy, because either legitimate traffic will be affected as a result of attack
mitigation, or significant manual effort is required to analyze the output and
exclude false alarms generated by the legitimate traffic.
Despite the interest in achieving high detection rate and low false alarm
rate altogether, there is inevitable tradeoff between these two metrics in DoS
detection systems. In anomaly-based DoS detection, the tradeoff is usually made
by varying the detection threshold, such that high threshold provides lower false
alarm rate at the cost of lowing detection rate, and vice versa.
The tradeoff between detection and false alarm rate depends on the choice
of detection paradigm when designing the DoS detection system. In general,
signature detection has low false alarm rate, but usually have low detection rate
on unforeseen attacks; anomaly detection has potentially high detection rate,
but its false alarm rate is also higher; classification-based detection is somewhere
between the other two paradigms in terms of detection and false alarm rate.
In recognition of this problem, hybrid systems have been designed which use
both signature detection and anomaly detection to combine the benefits of both
paradigms.

3.5

Denial-of-service Detection Paradigms

There are essentially three DoS attack detection paradigms, i.e. signature
detection, anomaly detection, and classification-based detection. Here we present
a brief overview of the paradigms and systems proposed, and discuss their advantages and limitations in detail.
3.5.1

Signature Detection (a.k.a misuse detection)

In signature detection the DoS detection decision is formed on the basis of
knowledge accumulated of known attacks or system vulnerabilities. A repository
of signatures is first generated by security expert to characterize the patterns
of known attacks. These signatures are then matched against observed traffic
to identify DoS attacks. An alarm is raised whenever a match is discovered.
Example systems include NSM [9], Bro [22], and Snort [24].
Since signature detection looks for patterns that are known to cause security
problems, it has the advantage of low false alarm rate and is able to provide
forensic information about the cause of alarms, which can be used by security
expert for further analysis. However, it is unable to detect any attacks that lie
beyond its knowledge, thus resulting in low detection rate on unforeseen attacks.
In addition, manually extracting representative signatures from large amounts
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of traffic data is usually time-consuming and labor-intensive, particularly with
the increasing complexity and scalability of today’s network traffic.
3.5.2

Anomaly Detection (a.k.a behavior detection)

Anomaly DoS detection techniques assume that an attack can be detected by
observing a deviation from the normal behavior of network traffic. The profile
of normal behavior is first extracted from normal traffic observed in the past
or synthesized traffic that are known to be attack-free. Later in the detection
mode, the observed network traffic is checked against the established profile of
traffic behavior. An alarm is generated when the traffic deviates from the profile
beyond a threshold. For instance, MULTOPS [8] uses disproportional packet
rates to and from hosts as a heuristic to detect flood DoS attack. PAYL [31]
detects occurrence of worm by profiling the byte distribution of packet payload
and looking for deviation from the established profile in the monitored network
traffic.
Advantages of anomaly detection lies in its capability to detect unforeseen
attacks, since no priori knowledge about specific attacks is required. However,
the observed anomaly does not necessarily indicate attacks, and false alarm rate
can be high, because the entire scope of the behavior of network traffic may not
be covered during the learning phase.
3.5.3

Classification-based Detection

Classification-based detection systems form a compound decision in view of
both normal behavior of network traffic and abnormal pattern of the attacks.
This is usually achieved by applying machine learning techniques to a labeled
dataset, in which the attack and normal traffic are correctly labeled, to generate
a classifier. The resulting classifier will then be used to classify monitored traffic
into ”normal” or ”attack”. For example, ADAM [3] and MADAM [15] build
their classifier using decision tree algorithm, whereas Mukkamala et.al [21] builds
the classifier using support vector machine and neural network algorithms.
In comparison to signature and anomaly detection, which derive their detection model from either attack-only or attack-free dataset, classification-based
detection derives its classifier from labeled dataset containing both attack and
normal traffic in an automated way that combines the benefits from both approaches.

3.6

Summary
Paradigm

Training Data

Signature-based

Attack-only

Anomaly-based

Normal-only

Classification-based

Labeled Mixture

Model
Programmed
Learned
Programmed
Learned
Learned

Systems
NSM, Bro, Snort, EMERALD,
GrIDS, NetSTAT, Shield
Honeycomb, Earlybird, Autograph
NSM, MULTPOS
PAYL, PHAD, IMAPIT, EMERALD
MADAM, ADAM, ANN&SVM

Table 1: DoS Detection Paradigms
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System
NSM
GrIDS
EMERALD
NetSTAT
Bro
Snort
Honeycomb

Ref Year
[9]
[27]
[23]
[29]
[22]
[24]
[13]

1990
1996
1997
1998
1999
1999
2004

Detection Paradigm1
Signature Anomaly
Classification
P
L
P
L
P
L
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Earlybird

[25] 2004

X

Autograph

[12] 2004

X

PHAD

[19] 2002

X

IMAPIT

[5]

2002

X

[32] 2004

X

PAYL

MULTOPS
MADAM
ADAM
ANN&SVM

[8]
[15]
[3]
[21]

2001
1999
2001
2002

Real-time
DoS
Detection

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Detection
Techniques
rule-based
rule-based
rule-based
rule-based
rule-based
rule-based
pattern
matching
pattern
matching
pattern
matching
header field
distribution
wavelet
analysis
payload
byte distribution
packet ratio
decision tree
naive bayes
artificial
neural
network

Table 2: Classification of surveyed systems according to the proposed taxonomy

In table 1 we conclude the classification of DoS detection paradigms with
example systems. We further provide a classification of surveyed systems according to our proposed taxonomy in table 2, with a brief description of used
techniques for each system.
In the following sections, we are going to selectively present the design and
implementation of some representative systems (shown in bold in both tables).
These include: (1)Snort, a system that provides signature-based light-weight
intrusion detection; (2)PHAD, an anomaly-based nonstationary model for detecting novel attacks; (3)MADAM, an automated framework for constructing
models for intrusion detection using machine learning algorithm; and (4) MULTOPS, a data structure for bandwidth attack detection. These systems cover
most of the detection paradigms in our proposed taxonomy;

4

Snort: Signature-based Intrusion Detection
for Networks

Snort [24] is a signature-based network intrusion detection system that performs real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It is intended
to be a lightweight cost-efficient IDS that can be deployed to monitor small
and lightly utilized networks. As one of the most widely deployed open-source
1 Abbreviation

used: P stands for Programmed, and L stands for Learned
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IDS, Snort’s architecture and rule language serve as a representative example
of signature-based IDS.

4.1

System Architecture
Network!
Packets

Packet!Decoder

Preprocessor

Detec(on!Engine

Alert!and!logging

Figure 2: System Architecture of Snort
Figure 2 shows the system architecture of Snort. In attack detection mode,
Snort monitors network traffic, analyzes it based on a rule set that encodes
attack signature, and performs specific actions as identified in the rules that are
matched by the network packets. The analysis is typically carried out in the
following components:
• Packet Decoder: The Packet Decoder decodes the raw packets observed
on the network according to the protocol that is used, from IP layer up to
application layer. The decoded packet header values are stored in a data
structure for later use in the Detection Engine.
• Preprocessor: The Preprocessor performs a variety of preprocessing
other than the standard packet decoding, before the data can be analyzed by Detection Engine. These include IP fragment assembly, TCP
stream assembly, packet header normalization, etc.
• Detection Engine: The Detection Engine carries out the actual attack
detection by matching various values obtained in the previous steps against
a set of rules that encodes patterns of known attacks. If a match is found,
the corresponding action that is defined in rule will be executed, e.g. drop
the packet, log the packet, generate alert to system administrator.
• Logging and Alerting System: This last component logs or generates
system alerts based on the action specified in the matched rules as well as
the options given at the start of the system.
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4.2

Snort Rules

Snort rules are simple to write, yet powerful enough to detect a wide range
of intrusive network traffic. Generally, each Snort rule is composed of action
directive and attack signature. The action directive specifies the action to take
when a packet matches the attack signature specified in the rule, which include:
1) pass rules that simply drop the packet, 2) log rules that write the full packet
to the logging routine, and 3) alert rules that generate an event notification and
log the full packet to enable later analysis. The attack signature specifies the
combination of packet values that warrents further actions.
log tcp any any -> 10.1.1.0/24 22
Figure 3: A simple Snort rule

alert udp $EXTERNAL NET any -> $HOME NET any
(msg:"DOS Teardrop attack"; id:242; fragbits:M;)
Figure 4: Alert rule for teardrop attack
Figure 3 shows a most basic rule that specifies only protocol, direction, IP
address and port number of interest. This rule would record all TCP packets
that are destined to port 22 (ssh) and 10.1.1 class C network address space,
regardless of its source IP address and port number. As a more advanced
example, Figure 4 shows a rule that detects teardrop attack. This rule would
fire for any UDP packet that is sent from outside network towards home network
when the IP id of the packet is 242 and the ”More Fragment” bit is set.

4.3

Evaluation

According to the taxonomy presented in Section 3, Snort is a signature-based
network intrusion detection system that can detect DoS attack. We summarize
the strength and weakness of Snort as follows.
Strengths:
• Snort employs a clear and concise rule language that describes per packet
tests and actions. The ease of use simplifies and expedites the development
of new attack detection rules, and allows Snort to rapidly respond to zeroday attacks. Therefore, Snort can be used to fill holes in commercial
vendor’s network-based IDS when signature updates are slow to come
from vendor in response to new attack.
• Snort is easy to deploy and run on all of today’s most popular operating
systems and is not confined to a fully vested server hardware platform. It
also provides an interactive GUI environment that allows user to configure
the system and analyze incoming traffic. This makes Snort easy to use for
even un-sophisticated users.
• Snort provides a signature repository that is actively updated on a daily
basis to detect most recent attacks. The real-time access to these attack
signatures enables users to respond to latest trends in intrusive activities
and DoS attacks.
12

Limitations:
• Since the mechanism used for attack detection in Snort is based on signature matching, system administrators have to apriori specify the patterns
of intrusive activity to look for. However, priori knowledge of attacks is not
always available; incomplete signatures will result in undetected attacks
and reduce detection rate.
• Snort is not designed to run in high speed networks without dropping
packets or slowing down the traffic. Instead, it is intended to be deployed
only in small and lightly utilized networks, or as a part of an integrated
network security infrastructure with other systems.

5

PHAD: Nonstationary Models for Detecting
Novel Attacks

PHAD [19] provides network anomaly detection by modeling normal behavior of attack-free network traffic. In contrast to other anomaly-based IDS whose
model remains stationary after the model training, PHAD uses a nonstationary
model that is continuously updated based on the monitored traffic. It monitors
the entire data link, network, and transport layer, and assigns anomaly score to
each packet based on the observed packet header values.

5.1

Learning Nonstationary Models

An important features provided by PHAD is the ability to adapt to state
changes over time, as opposed to other stationary anomaly detection model
which depends exclusively on the profile of training data. This is based on
the observation that many types of network processes, such as the rate of a
particular type of packet, are nonstationary. No matter how short or long the
sample data is, the stationary model can not predict rate of events for other
samples.
In order to find events that have the lowest probability, i.e. most anomalous,
PHAD assigns to each event an anomaly score that is inversely proportional to
the estimated probability of the event. As a simplification, the anomaly score
is only assigned to novel events that have never occurred in the training data.
Specifically, if an experiment is performed n times and r different values are
observed in the training data, and the novel event is last observed t seconds ago
in the monitored traffic, then the novel event is scored as tn/r. Note that n and
r remain stationary after the model training, whereas t is continuously updated
based on the monitored traffic during attack detection.

5.2

Packet Header Anomaly Detection

PHAD monitors 33 fields from Ethernet, IP, and transport layer (TCP, UDP,
or ICMP) packet header for intrusion detection. For each field that has a value
never observed in training, an anomaly score of tn/r is computed, and the sum
of scores across different fields is assigned to the packet. If the final score exceeds
a threshold, then an alarm is signaled.
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anomaly score =

X

ti ni /ri , where field i is novel in training.

i

Clustering: In order to generalize continuous field values that span across a
large range (e.g. TCP port), the set of observed values is clustered into a set of
continuous ranges. Each newly observed value forms a cluster by itself; if the
number of clusters exceeds a limit C, then two closest ones are merged into a
single cluster. For purpose of anomaly detection, r is the number of times the
set of clusters is updated.
Attribute
Ethernet Size
Ether Dest Hi
Ether Dest Lo
Ether Protocol
IP Header Len
IP TOS
IP Length
IP Frag ID
IP Frag Ptr
IP Protocol
IP Checksum
IP Source Addr
IP Dest Addr
...

r/n
508/12814738
9/12814738
12/12814738
4/12814738
1/12715589
4/12715589
527/12715589
4117/12715589
2/12715589
3/12715589
1/12715589
293/12715589
287/12715589
...

Observed Values
46 60-1181 1182. . .
x0000c0 x00105A. . .
x000009 x09B949. . .
x0136 x0800 x0806. . .
x45
x00 x08 x10 xC0
38-1500. . .
0-65461 65462. . .
x0000 x4000. . .
1 6 17
xFFFF
12.0.169.104. . .
0.67.97.110. . .
...

Table 3: Example PHAD Model [19]

Table 3 shows the example PHAD model for Ethernet and IP header fields
after training on 7 days of attack-free network traffic with C = 32. It shows
the name of each packet header, the observed values of n and r, and a partial
list of observed values or clusters. For example, the first line says that out of
12,814,738 packets with an Ethernet size field, there are 508 times when the set
of clusters are updated. Three of these clusters are 42, 60-1181, and 1182.

5.3

Application Layer Anomaly Detection

Application Layer Anomaly Detection (ALAD) can be combined with PHAD
to improve detection rate. Instead of assigning anomaly scores to packets, ALAD
assigns scores to incoming TCP connections that are assembled from packets.
In particular, the anomaly scores are aggregated over the following five classes
of attributes.
• P(src IP | dest IP), where src IP is the external source address of the
client making the request, and dest IP is the local host address. A separate
pair of r and n is generated for each local dest IP based on the observed
value of srcIP that connects to it. This class learns the normal set of
clients for each host.
• P(src IP | dest IP, dest port). This is similar to the class defined
above except that there is a separate (r, n) for each server on each host.
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It learns the normal set of clients for each server on each host, which may
be different across servers on the same host.
• P(dest IP, dest port). This class learns the set of local servers which
normally receive requests. It should catch probes that attempts to access
nonexistent hosts or services.
• P(TCP flags | dest port). This model learns the set of normal TCP
flag sequence for the first, next to last, and last packet of a connection.
Separate models are generated for each port number, which usually indicates the type of service (e.g. mail, FTP, http). An anomaly can result if a
connection is opened or closed abnormally, indicating an abuse of service.
• P(keyword | dest port). This model examines the text in the incoming
TCP stream to learn the allowable set of keywords for each service. A
keyword is defined as the first word on a line of input. An anomaly
indicates the use of a rarely used feature of service, which is common in
many R2L attack.
Attribute
80 (HTTP)

r/n
13/83650

25 (SMTP)
21 (FTP)

34/142610
11/16822

Observed Values
Accept-Charset:
Accept-Encoding:
Accept-Language:
Accept:
Cache-Control:
Connection:
GET
Host:
(5 values . . . )
(34 values . . . )
(11 values . . . )

Table 4: Example ALAD Model [19]

Table 4 shows the example ALAD model for P(keyword|dest port) for ports
80, 25, and 21 after training on the same 7 days of attack-free network traffic as
used in Table 3. For example, the first line says that only 13 different keywords
were observed out of 83,650 TCP connections to port 80. Part of these keywords
are listed in the third column.

5.4

Evaluation

Table 5 shows the detection rate of PHAD and ALAD on DARPA 1999
dataset. The anomaly threshold is configured to allow 10 false alarms per day. It
shows that PHAD and ALAD can achieve 54.2% detection rate on DoS attacks
without requiring any prior knowledge of attacks. Further, notice that there
is almost no overlap between PHAD and ALAD. PHAD detects mostly probes
and DoS attacks that exploit low level network protocols, whereas ALAD detects
user behavior anomalies (all U2R and some R2L) at the application layer. We
summarize their strength and limitations as follows.
Strengths:
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Category
Probing
DoS
U2R
R2L
Overall

Total Detected (%)
32.4
54.2
34.7
25.7
38.9

By PHAD (%)
21.6
28.8
0.0
0.0
13.9

(By ALAD (%))
13.5
25.4
34.7
25.7
25.6

Table 5: Detection Rate of PHAD and ALAD on DARPA 1999 Dataset [19]

• There is significant non-overlap between PHAD and other systems that
use signature detection. Therefore, they can be deployed in combination
with other signature-based systems to improve detection performance.
• PHAD and ALAD are non-stationary models that adapt to system state
changes over time. This approach avoids the problem of stationary model
whose performance degrades as a result of established profile of traffic
behavior becoming outdated with the evolving network traffic.
Limitations:
• There is combinatorial explosion problem of combining attributes. ALAD
uses combination of the form P(X, Y) and P(Y|X), but these were ad-hoc.
It will be helpful to automate the selection of attributes from among the
exponential number of possibilities in an efficient way.
• Even when an anomaly is detected, PHAD can not provide much forensic
information to characterize detected attack (e.g. the specific vulnerability that the attack exploits). As an anomaly-based detection system,
PHAD detects anomaly by comparing the current system behavior with
established profile using high level statistics. Consequently, it does not
necessarily have enough information to analyze the cause of intrusion.

6

MADAM: A Data Mining Framework for Intrusion Detection

MADAM [15] is a classification-based automated framework for building
intrusion detection models. The previous signature-based Snort and anomalybased PHAD require either manual process to analyze and encode attack signature, or guesswork to select statistical measures for normal usage profiles. In
contrast, MADAM enables automated selection of predictive features by using
data mining algorithms, and applies machine learning algorithm on the labeled
audit data to generate intrusion detection models. Therefore, MADAM presents
a systematic and automated approach for building intrusion detection systems.

6.1

System Framework

Figure 5 shows the system framework of MADAM. In the process of applying
MADAM, (1) raw audit data is first processed into ASCII network packet information; (2) these are in turn summarized into connection records containing a
number of basic features, such as destination port and connection duration; (3)
16

Framework for Constructing Features and Models

Fig. 1.

•

231

The data mining process of building ID models.

Figure 5: System Framework of MADAM [15]
components of the framework include programs for learning classifiers and
meta-classifiers [Chan and Stolfo 1993], association rules [Agrawal et al.
1993] for link analysis, and frequent episodes [Mannila et al. 1995] for
sequence
analysis.
It then
also contains
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are
applieda support
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to compute
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patterns;
4)
finally,
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is
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to the
structing and evaluating detection models. The end products are concise
processedand
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todetect
generate
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Note that the
intuitive rules
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and can be easily
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and edited
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when needed.
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example,
poor performance of the machine learnThe process of applying MADAM ID can be summarized in Figure 1. Raw
ing model(binary)
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steps.
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example
connection
record.
Meta-learning is used to learn the correlation of intrusion evidence from
multiple detection models, and to produce a combined detection model.

timestamp
1.1
1.1
1.1
...
10.1
12.3
13.4
...

duration
service
src ip
dst ip
src byte
dst byte
ACM Transactions
on
Information
Security, Vol.
0
http
spoofed
1 and System
victim
0 3, No. 4, November
0 2000.
0
http
spoofed 2
victim
0
0
0
http
spoofed 3
victim
0
0
...
...
...
...
...
...
2
ftp
addr1
addr2
200
300
1
smtp
addr2
addr4
250
300
60
telnet
addr1
addr4
200
12100
...
...
...
...
...
...

flag
S0
S0
S0
...
SF
SF
SF
...

...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

Table 6: Network connection records [15]

6.1.2

Automatic Feature Construction

Frequent episode analysis is applied to both normal connection data and
attack data. The resulting patterns are then compared to find the attack-only
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patterns. Briefly, frequent episode analysis can discover those time-based sequence of audit events which frequently occur together, and use those patterns
to provide guidelines for incorporating temporal statistical measures into intrusion detection models.
For example, consider the SYN flood attack record shown in table 6. Here
the attacker used many spoofed source addresses to send a lot of S0 connections
to HTTP port of the victim in a short time interval. Table 7 shows the top
attack-only pattern extracted from this record using frequent episode analysis.
Frequent episode
(service = http, flag=S0, dst ip = victim),
(service = http, flag = S0, dst ip = victim)
→ (service = http), flag = S0, dst ip =
victim [0.93, 0.03, 2]

Meaning
93% of the time, after two http connections with S0 flag are made to host victim,
within 2 seconds from the first of these two,
the third similar connection is made, and
this pattern occurs in 3% of the time.

Table 7: Example Attack Pattern [15]

Each of these intrusion patterns is used as a guideline for incorporating additional features into the connection models to build better classification model.
In particular, for a given intrusion pattern with reference feature F0 and a time
window of w seconds, the following features are added.
• A count of these connections.
• Let F1 be service, src ip or dst ip other than F0 . If the same F1 value
is in all item sets of the episode, add a percentage of connections that
share the same F1 (e.g. http) value as current connection; otherwise, add
a percentage of different values of F1 .
• Let V2 be a value (e.g. S0) of a feature F2 (e.g. flag) other than F0 and F1.
If V2 is in all the item sets of the episode, add a percentage of connections
that have the same V2 ; otherwise, if F2 is a numerical feature, add an
average of the F2 values.
To provide a better understanding of the output from automatic feature
construction, Here we provide a summary of temporal and statistical features
that are constructed by MADAM from network audit data.
• The ”same host” features that examine only the connections in the past
2 seconds that have the same destination host as the current connection:
the count of such connection, the percentage of connections that have the
same service as current connection, the percentage of different service, the
percentage of S0 flag, and the percentage of REJ flag.
• The ”same service” features that examine only the connections in the
past 2 seconds that have the same service as current connections: the
count of such connections, the percentage of different destination host,
the percentage of S0 flag, and the percentage of REJ flag.
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6.1.3

Classification

Provided with the labeled audit data and a set of features constructed from
previous steps, machine learning algorithm can be used to automatically learn
the classification model. Specifically, MADAM uses RIPPER [6], a classification
rule learning algorithm, to generate rules for classifying connection records into
”normal” or ”attack”. Table 8 shows an example RIPPER rule for detecting
smurf DoS attack.
RIPPER rule
smurf :- service=ecr i, host count > 5,
host srv count > 5

Meaning
If the service is icmp echo request, and for
the past 2 seconds, the number of connections that have the same destination host
as the current one is at least 5, and the
number of connections that have the same
service as the current one is at least 5, then
this is a smurf attack (a DOS attack)

Table 8: Example RIPPER Rule for Detecting Smurf Attack [15]

Meta-classification: Finally, meta-classification mechanism can be used to
combine the results from multiple detection models to further improve detection
performance. In particular, three base classification models can be generated
based on different sets of features to detect different categories of attacks. The
output from these base models are converted into meta-level records that consist
of four features: the three predications from each of the base models, plus the
true class label. RIPPER is then applied to learn the rules that combine the
results to make a final prediction on a connection.

6.2

Evaluation
Category
Probing
DoS
U2R
R2L
Overall

Old (%)
97.0
79.9
75.0
60.0
80.2

New (%)
96.7
24.3
81.8
5.9
37.7

Table 9: Detection Rate of MADAM on DARPA 1998 Dataset [15]

Table 9 shows the detection rate of MADAM on DARPA 1998 dataset. Here,
new intrusions refer to those that did not have corresponding instance in the
training data. Note that MADAM achieves 79.9% detection rate on known DoS
attacks and 24.3% detection rate on novel DoS attacks. We summarize the
strength and weakness of MADAM as follows.
Strengths:
• MADAM provides an automated framework for selecting predictive features and building intrusion detection models by applying data mining
algorithms. This automatic approach eliminates the need to manually
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analyze and encode attack signatures, as well as guesswork in selecting
predictive statistical features for normal traffic behavior.
• Enabled by the use of meta-learning, MADAM provides adaptability and
extensibility in building intrusion detection systems. Meta-learning improves detection performance by combining results from multiple models.
Thus new mechanisms can be introduced into existing IDS without significant re-engineering.
Limitations:
• The classification-based approach adopted in MADAM requires a labeled
dataset that contains both target intrusions and normal traffic, which itself
is hard to obtain. Improper labeling in the training dataset may lead to
false positive or false negative.
• The MADAM assumes the presence of representative target attacks in
the training dataset. Consequently, the features constructed based on
available attack instance are potentially specialized to known attacks.

7

MULTOPS: A Data Structure for Bandwidth
Attack Detection

MULTOPS [8] is a data structure that enables router or network monitors
to detect ongoing bandwidth attack. It uses disproportional packet rates to
and from hosts and subnets as a heuristic to detect attacks. To keep track of
ratio of forwarding packets to reverse packets for each address prefix, a treeshaped data structure is used to collect these statistics in real-time to look for
disproportional packet rate behavior. Further, tree expansion and contraction
are used to avoid memory explosion and reduce CPU utilization.
Unlike prior systems that examine the value of packet payload and header
fields for attack detection, MULTOPS relies only on the destination IP address
extracted from the IP header. This is due to the distinct nature of bandwidth attacks: attackers release high volume of network traffic towards victim
to exhaust its network or system resource where attack traffic (i.e. header and
payload value) can be completely indistinguishable from legitimate traffic.

7.1

Proportional Packet Rate Assumption

MULTOPS is based on the assumption that under normal operations, the
packet rate in one direction is proportional to the packet rate in the opposite
direction. The heuristic appears to hold broadly for most TCP and UDP applications: (1) TCP acknowledges every single—or every k—received packets,
and, therefore, has proportional packet flows; (2) Although UDP does not provide delivery confirmation, in benign UDP-based applications there is usually a
mechanism in the application layer that makes sure the other party has received
the packets, similar to TCP ACK. Note that the second assumption is empirically validated on UDP traffic collected from a large number of production
networks [4].
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increases its memory use. Figure 7 shows how a new node is added to the tree
to keep track of all packet rates to and from addresses with prefix 130.16.120.*
Contraction: The reverse of expansion is contraction. Contracting a record
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exhaustionflows between sender
width attacksAn
which
disproportional
attack against MULTOPS by causing it to branch proreceiver.
The reverse of expansion is contraction.and
Contracting
a
fusely. The two opposing forces are the attacker causing
record involves removing a subtree from under a record.
nodes to be created versus contraction causing nodes to
• MULTOPS
detection
at router
rather
A subtree is contracted when the aggregate
packet rate performs
be destroyed.
Since a subtree
is contracted
whenthan
the at the victim netfor that subtree drops below
. Contraction
donethatpacket
rates to and
from addresses
with stopped
a certain prefix
work, isso
malicious
packets
can be
before they cause any
to constrain memory use and to avoid (maliciously inare less than the expand threshold, the attacker will have
damage.
tended) memory exhaustion. Figure 3 shows how a node
to sustain a higher packet rate for as many different adis contracted.
dress prefixes as possible. Section 5.4 deals with this
Limitations: issue in a quantitative context.
UPDATE
HANDLE PACKET )

• MULTOPS may cause collateral-damage to legitimate traffic when it ratelimits or drops all packets destined to those hosts that are identified as
being under attack.
• MULTOPS fails to detect those attacks that deploy a large number of
proportional flows to cripple a victim. For example, attackers can use
FTP or HTTP connections with relatively low but still proportional packet
rates.
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8

Distributed Denial-of-service Mitigation

Once an attack is detected, immediate action can be taken to mitigate its
impact on the network. This typically involves rate limiting or blocking suspicious traffic at the local network. Although such mitigation approach can
effectively stop DoS vulnerability attack, it is essentially useless against DDoS
attack, because the presence of malicious traffic on the local network itself is
already denying the use of resources to legitimate users.
Two alternative approaches have been proposed to mitigate DDoS attack by
filtering out suspicious traffic before they can reach victim. The first approach,
called Pushback [10], filters out suspicious traffic at upstream routers closer
to source of attack, whereas the second approach redirects traffic to a cleaning
center [2] that performs traffic cleaning before sending them back to the original
destination.

8.1

Pushback

In Pushback [10], once an attack is detected at the victim, the characterization of the suspicious traffic, such as source or destination IP address of packets,
can be sent to the upstream router, which blocks the traffic that matches the
given characterization.
R2

R1

R3

R0

Server!
B

Server!
A

Figure 8: DDoS attack in progress

To illustrate Pushback, consider the network in Figure 8. Rn are ISP routers
with processing capacity 100Gbps; A, B are commercial servers. Suppose DDoS
attack is launched against server A via router R1 and R2 with a throughput of
60Gbps each, denoted in red and blue. Consequently, router R0 is overloaded,
causing collateral damage to the legitimate traffic from R3 to B. Simply blocking
traffic destined to server A at router R0 will not help mitigate its impact, since
it is still overloading processing capacity at server A.
By using Pushback, R0 can request server R1 and R2 to block all the traffic
that are destined to server A. This approach immediately provides two benefits:
(1) server B can now successfully receive legitimate traffic via router R0; (2)
router R1 and R2 can perform more complex analysis to filter out malicious
traffic, since the traffic load on them is within their capacity. Further, this
process can be repeated until it reaches the router that is closest to the source
of attack.
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9 Discussion
cale to the large number of enThis method takes advantage of the fact that the capacity of
y and those that are yet to join In this section, we conclude our survey paper with a comparison of the
the backbone is large. Thus, it can absorb the attack traffic withsystems that we have presented in previous sections, followed by a discussion of
out the need to install router filters which could block all traffic
the challenges.
to the victim. Apart from traffic cleaning, there are other applications that could benefit from the cleaning center concept.
9.1 Comparison of Denial-of-service Detection Techniques
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in Table 10, where the cells with the highest performance on each line are
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Performance
Detection rate of known vulnerability attack
Detection rate of unknown vulnerability attack
Detection rate of flood attack
False alarm rate
Ease of model construction
DoS flood attack mitigation

Snort
High
Low
Yes
Low
Medium
No

MADAM
High
Low
Yes
Low
High
No

PHAD
Medium
Medium
No
Medium
High
No

Table 10: A Summary of Performance Evaluation for Surveyed Systems

does not have any prior knowledge of attack. MULTOPS is not able to
detect DoS vulnerability attacks.
• Detection rate of unknown DoS vulnerability attack: Snort has the
lowest detection rate on unknown attacks due to its reliance on existing
attack signatures. MADAM has somewhat better, but still low, detection
rate on known attacks. PHAD does not require prior knowledge of specific
attacks, and achieves moderate detection rate. Again, MULTOPS is not
able to detect DoS vulnerability attacks.
• DoS flood attack mitigation: MULTOPS is the only system here that
provides mitigation against DoS flood attacks before they can reach victim.
The other three systems can not mitigate DoS flood attacks.
• False alarm rate: Both Snort and MADAM have low false alarm rate
due to their focus on detecting known attacks. PHAD, as an anomaly
based detector, has relatively high false alarm rate. The false alarm rate
of MULTOPS depends on the effectiveness of proportional packet rate
assumption.
• Ease of training: Snort requires the most effort to manually analyze
and write attack signatures. MADAM provides an automated framework
for building detection models, thus requiring much less manual effort.
Similarly, PHAD constructs the behavior profile of normal traffic in an
automated way. MULTOPS is the easiest to build among all four systems,
since only a predefined threshold for expected packet ratio is required.

9.2

Challenges

• Extensibility: Extensibility is critical in today’s network computing environment. Specifically, an extensible detection system should 1) allow
additional modules or functionalities to be incorporated into existing system without significant re-engineering; (2) enabling emerging attacks to
be detected without having to re-train the entire model. Currently, most
anomaly-based systems (e.g. PHAD) need to completely re-train the behavior model when the traffic changes. More recent systems, such as
Bro [22], have made extensibility their primary goal.
• Forensic Information: In addition to detecting attacks, an ideal detection system should also provide forensic information that could help a
security analyst identify important characteristics of the attack and take
25

MULTOPS
Low
Low
Yes
Low
High
Yes

immediate response. Relevant information includes the system vulnerability exploited, the common substring in the packet payload, and the impact
on the system. Currently, there lacks a standard and focus on providing
these information.
• Scalability: It is becoming increasingly difficult for uniprocessor systems
to process rapidly growing network throughput with increasingly complex
analysis required for attack detection. In order to meet this performance
requirement, a scalable design that can exploit today’s multi-core processors is needed. That requires careful design, however, to (1) evenly balance
load across cores and (2) support exchange of states across threads. It is
a popular area of research in recent years to parallelize existing intrusion
detection systems on commodity PC [11] or specialized hardware [28].
• DDoS Attack Mitigation: Despite the growing popularity and interest,
DDoS attack remains a major threat facing enterprise networks of all
size, specifically, for two reasons: (1) it would be prohabitively expensive
or even impossible to deploy enough computation and network resources
at each enterprise network that can combat DDoS attack. (2) dropping
suspicious packets usually cause collateral damage to legitimate packets,
because the attack traffic behaves like the normal traffic from legitimate
users. As an alternative solution, efforts have been made to mitigate DDoS
attack at upstream router [10] or at cleaning center [2] which has enough
resource to filter out attack traffic.
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